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Technical change and US economic
growth: the interwar period
and the 1990s
Alexander J. Field

5.1 Introduction
Looking back over the twentieth century, the year 1948-1973 stand out as the
"golden age" of labor productivity growth and living tandard improvement
in the United State - the result of a combination of re pectable multifactor
productivity (MEP) growth and robust rates of capital deepening. The period
1973- 1989, in contra t, wa the mo t di appointing, because of the virtual
collap e of multifactor productivity growth during the e year . The contrast
between these period gave rise to a raft of studies trying to pinpoint the cau e of
the slowdown in MFP growth and, a a con equence, labor productivity growth.
More recently, attention ha hifted towards determining the contribution of the
IT revolution to the revival of productivity growth in the 1990 .
Mo t of these studies, however, embrace an hi torical perspective that reaches
back no further than 1948, the year in which most of the standard series maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS) begin. This chapter, in contra t,
pushe the time horizon back to the beginning of the twentieth century, with
particular attention to the period following the Fir t World War and preceding US entry into the Second World War in 1941. It combine a summary of
the magnitude and sources of productivity advance during the interwar years
(for more details, ee Field, 2003, 2006a) with a comparative examination of
progre during the la t decade of the century.
Becau e of the influence of cyclical factors on productivity levels, it i common in historical re earch to re trict calculation of productivity growth rates
to peak-to-peak comparison . For the mo t recent episode, this requires measurement from 1989 to 2000. Many tudents of the productivity revival prefer,
nevertheless, to measure from 1995. Although 1995 i not a business cycle
peak, the acceleration in output growth after 1995 does make the revival look
more striking. Whether it i de irable or appropriate to choo e one 's start date
with the objective of making the contra t between recent and pa t history more
dramatic is, of cour e, an open que tion.
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Table 5.1 Compound annual growth rates of MFP, labor, and capital
productivity in the US private non-farm economy, 1901-2000

MFP

Output/hour

Output/adju ted hour

Output/unit
capital input

1901 - 19 19
19 19- 1929
1929- 194 1
194 1- 1948
1948- 1973
1973- 1989
1989-2000

1.08
2.02
2.31
1.29
1.90
0.34
0.78

1.71
2.27
2.35
1.71
2.88
1.34
1.92

1.44
2.33
2.2 1
1.42
2.64
1.03
1.41

0.01
1.09
2.47
1.32
0.18
- 1.24
- 0.61

1973- 1995
1995- 2000

0. 38
1.1 4

1.37
2.46

0.98
2.08

- 0.98
- 0.84

NB : "Output per adju ted hour" u es an hour index that ha been augmented to refl ect
changes in labor quality or compo ition . In creating thi index, different categories of
labor are weighted by the ir res pective wage rate .

Sources: 1901 - 1948 - Kendrick (1961 , tab le A-XXIII; the unadjusted data are fro m
the column headed "Output per man hour," the adju ted data from the column headed
"Output per unit of labor-input," and capital productivity i " Output per unit of capital
input"); I 948- 2000 - Bureau of Labor Stati tic , www.bl .gov , seri es MPU75002 1,
MPU750023, MPU750024, and MPU750028; the e data are from the multifac tor productivity secti on of the web ite, accessed 12 April 2004; the labor productivity ection
contain more recent data and is updated more frequently.

That said, the recent achievement i impre ive when mea ured in relation
to the period of low growth that preceded it. But, even if we how the recent
acceleration in its be t light, by measuring from 1995 to the peak of the cycle
in 2000, the end-of-ce ntury labor productivity advance remained well below
"golden age" rates. Perhap more urpri ingly, it remained in the same range
as that regi tered during the interwar period ( ee table 5.1 ). And multifactor productivity growth was less than half what it wa during the Depression
years. 1
The seminal studie by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) showed that,
in compari on with the nineteenth century, a large gap opened up in the first
half of the twentieth century between the growth of real output and a weighted
average of inputs conventionally measured. Thi gap, termed the "residual," wa
sub equently interpreted by Abramovitz a reflecting a shift to a knowledgebased type of economic development, which, from the vantage point of the
middle of the century, wa expected to persist (Abramovitz, 1993 , p. 224).
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By and large it did o for another quarter-century. But the ixteen-year period
of low productivity growth generally dated from 1973 forced, or hould have
forced, a rea essment of the view that the Abramovitz and Solow tudie had
identified a permanent ea change. The end-of-century revival of productivity
growth, in tum, ha focu ed attention on what caused the growth of the residual
to accelerate and how much of it could be laid at the feet of IT.
This chapter focu es on the two major cycle of the interwar period ( 19191929 and 1929-1941 ) and the more recent 1989-2000 period. All three period
experienced comparable labor productivity growth rates. The respective contribution of multifactor productivity growth and capital deepening were, however,
quite different, as were the sectoral locations of rapid advance.

5.2 Overview of twentieth-century growth trends
For the moment, let's look forward from 1929. With some implification the
labor productivity growth history of the United State between 1929 and 1995
can be thought of as con isting of three periods in which the re pective contributions of MFP growth and capital deepening were quite di tinct. The years
1929-1948 witnes ed exceptionally high rates of MFP growth, but little capital
deepening.
Between 1948 and 1973 lower but till re pectable MFP growth combined
with a revival of phy ical capital deepening to produce the highest rates of labor
productivity growth in the century, and a golden age of living standard improvement. Between 1973 and 1995 capital deepening continued at omewhat slower
rates but multifactor productivity growth in the US economy effectively disappeared. Labor productivity ro e, but at greatly reduced rate (1.37 percent per
year) compared with the 2.88 percent annual growth clocked during the golden
age (see table 5.1 ; data are for the private non-farm economy (PNE)) . At the
end of the century labor productivity growth again approached golden age rates,
principally a the result of a revival of MFP growth .

5.3 The rise in output per hour during the Depression:
causes and consequences
A number of economist have been aware of the ri e in output per hour during the Depres ion , but most of the attention in explaining thi ha been on
the effects of the selective retention of worker , particularly during the 19291933 downturn (Margo, 1991). By 1941 , however, when recovery had finally
pu hed unemployment rates into single-digit level , much of this hould have
been unwound. There were secular improvements in labor quality during the
Depre ion years as well, but a compari on of column 2 and 3 of table 5.1 suggests that such improvements can explain only a small fraction of the growth
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in output per hour between 1929 and 1941. 2 Clearly, other factors had to have
been operative - and these could not have included phy ical capital deepening,
as can also be een from table 5.1.
Since there was virtually no increa e in private sector inputs conventionally
measured between 1929 and 1941, MFP advance accounted for all of the 32
percent increase in the real output of the private non-farm economy over these
years. And, since there wa no private ector capital deepening, the same was
true for the increa e in output per hour. Masked by the continuing level of
high unemployment, an impre sive expansion of the potential output of the US
economy was taking place.
Does the claim that the Depression years witne sed the highest MFP growth
rate of the century include consideration of the end-of-century "new economy"
boom? The short answer is that it does. My office at a univer ity in the heart of
Silicon Valley offered a ring ide view of the investment boom, the rising share
prices, and some of the hyperbolic claim that drove both. For better or for worse,
thi enthusia m led to a reorganization of the federal government's statistical
apparatus in an effort to make it more sensitive to the possible contributions of
the IT revolution to growth.
But the data from the end of the twentieth century, even after incorporating the
use of hedonic methods to adju t for quality change , tell a more nuanced tory.
Revolutionary technological or organizational change - the ort that hows
up in MFP growth - was concentrated in distribution, ecurities trading, and
a narrow range of industries within a hrinking manufacturing sector. MFP
advance within industry wa largely localized within the old SIC 35 and 36, 3
sector that include the production of semiconductors, computers, networking,
and telecommunication equipment. Aggregate MFP growth remained modest
by the historical standards of the twentieth century.
Evidence from the beginning of the twenty-first century suggests the possibility of more ub tantial MFP payback in the IT-u ing sectors, albeit delayed
(Wall Street Journal, 2003) . Labor productivity grew at 3.04 percent per year
continuously compounded from 1995 through 2004 (BLS series PRS85006093,
acce sed 19 June 2005) . This represents very strong performance, particularly
after 2000. At the time this chapter was written, however, we did not have MFP
estimates beyond 2002, so it remains unclear how much of early twenty-fir tcentury growth must be due to an increa e in the labor composition contribution due to selective retention (which would not persi tat thi rate through
a full recovery), or how much the capital deepening contribution may have
changed since the heady days of 1995-2000. Capital ervice grew at 5.38 percent per year between 1995 and 2000, and their rate of increa e has certainly
slowed. But hour , which grew at over 2 percent per year between 1995 and
2000, declined at 1.85 percent per year between 2000:2 and 2003:2. Even with
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sub equent recovery, hours in 2005: 1 were still 3 percent below their peak in
2000. Until we have the most recent capital ervice number we can't know
what has happened to the capital/hour ratio. Between 2000 and 2002 (the
latest year for which we have capital services data) capital services per hour
ro every rapidly - a total of 12.4 percent - a the numerator continued tori e
and the denominator declined. We will need to have the economy approach
cJoser to potential output, and have the data for it, before we can have a clearer
picture of the u tainability of these recent trends. The bottom line is that,
mea uring from 1989 through the end of the boom in 2000, aggregate MFP
growth, including that in the IT-using sectors, although more than double the
rate in 1973-1989, was only a third that regi tered between 1929 and 1941 (see
table 5.1 ).
Why 1989? And why 2000? Multifactor productivity data i available only
on an annual basis. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) busines cycle chronology, the peak of activity in July 1990 wa followed by a rece ion that bottomed out in March 1991 , followed by the long
expansion of the 1990 , culminating in the peak 120 months later (March 2001).
But 2001 was also a year of economic downturn , with the trough reached only
eight months afterward , in November that year. Similarly, 1990 included five
post-peak month . Since we are u ing annual data, I mea ure from the la t full
year of expan ion (1989) before a downturn to the ubsequent final full year of
expansion before a downturn (2000). 4
It i well known that MFP and labor productivity grew at an accelerated
pace during the econd half of the 1990s, and it has become conventional to
mea ure to and from 1995 , even though the year was not a business cycle
peak. The argument again t 1995 is that it is not a peak, a point reflected in
the controver y urrounding Gordon's claims that much of the end-of-century
improvement reflected a cyclical acceleration in both labor and multifactor
productivity common in later tage of a busine expansion (Gordon , 2003c).
Nevertheless, there doe eem to be a break in the eries circa 1995, and, in
deference to current practice, table 5.1 also reports MFP advance over the last
five years of the century. Here the compound average annual growth rate comes
in at 1.14 percent per year. This i three times the anemic MFP growth regi tered
between 1973 and 1995. But it i still sub tantially below golden age rates and,
even more remarkably, less than half the rate registered between 1929 and
1941.

5.4 The role of manufacturing
If we are discussing contributions to achieved productivity levels in the interwar period, it i appropriate to place a good deal of empha i on a growing
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Table 5.2 The growth of MFP, labor, and capital productivity in
manufacturing in the United States, 1919-2000

MFP

Output/hour

Output/adjusted hour

Output/unit
capital input

1919- 1929
1929-1941
1941-1948
1949- 1973
1973- 1989
1989- 2000

5.12
2.60
- 0.52
1.49
0.57
1.58

5.45
2.61
0.20
2.51
2.42
3.56

5.45
2.46
0.03
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

4.20
2.96
-1.82
-0.03
-1 .22
0.16

1973- 1995
1995-2000

0.66
2.09

2.61
4.07

n.a.
n.a.

- 0.82
0.08

Sources: 1919- 29 - Kendrick (1961 , table D-1, p. 464); 1929- 1941 and 1941- 1948 output and labor input are from Kendrick (1961, tables D-1 and D-2), capital input is
based on the index for manufacturing fixed capital in the BEA 's Fixed As et Table
(4.2, www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dN/FAweb/lndex2002.htm), MFP is calculated based on
an assumed share of 0.7 for labor, 0.3 for capital; 1949-2000 - Bureau of Labor
Statistics , series MPU300001 , MPU300002, MPU300003, acces ed 22 November
2004.

manufacturing sector that by 1941 comprised almost a third of the economy.
I estimate that 84 percent of MFP growth in the private non-farm economy
between 1919 and 1929 and about 48 percent of the growth between 1929 and
1941 originated in manufacturing (see below). For 1995-2000 manufacturing 's
contribution was about 39 percent of private non-farm MFP growth, but that
total and manufacturing 's percentage point contribution to it were much maller
than was true in the interwar period.
Although Kendrick does not provide enough information to allow the calculation of MFP growth rates within manufacturing for the 1929-1941 and 19411948 sub-periods, one can do so for the sector as a whole using Kendrick 's
e timates for output and labor input combined with capital input data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis's (BEA's) Fixed Asset Tables (see table 5.2). 5
These calculations show MFP growth within the ector over the 1929-41 period
to have proceeded at the rate of 2.60 percent per year. This is higher than
in any subsequent period of the twentieth century. It does, however, represent a halving of the 5.12 percent rate registered over the 1919-1929 period,
years in which the flexibility offered by the unit drive electric motor facilitated
the shift to a single-story layout and the as embly line production of automobiles and a host of new electrically powered consumer durables (Devine, 1983;
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Table 5.3 The employment of scientists and engineers in US manufacturing,
1927-1940
1927

1933

1940

Chemicals
Electrical machinery
Petroleum
Non-electrical machinery
Primary metals
Transport eq uipment
Food/beverage
Stone/clay/glas
Fabricated metal products
Instruments
Rubber products

1812
732
465
421
538
256
354
410
334
234
36 1

3255
1322
994
629
850
394
651
569
500
581
564

7675
3269
2849
2122
21 13
1765
171 2
1334
1332
1318
1000

Totals, eleven industries
Totals, manufacturing

5917
6274

10309
1091 8

26489
27777

Sources : National Research Council data, cited in Mowery (1981); Mowery and Rosenberg (2000, p. 814).

David and Wright, 2003; Field, 2004). My calculations also suggest, consistent
with arguments advanced in Field (2003, 2005), a decline in the level of MFP
in manufacturing over the 1941-1948 period.
Technical advance in manufacturing during the 1929-1941 period was not
as rapid and not as uniformly distributed aero s two-digit industries as was
true during the 1920s. The performance in the Depression years looks more
impressive, however, when contrasted with what took place in the second half
of the century, including the "new economy" period at the end of the 1990s.
Although technical progress was broadest and most uniformly high during the
1920s, advance within manufacturing wa taking place across a broader frontier
during the Depression than was the case in the 1990s.
MFP advance in manufacturing during the Depression years was increasingly dependent on organized re earch and development. Table 5.3 summarizes National Research Council (NRC) data on the employment of scientists
and engineers in US manufacturing. Total R&D employment increased from
6,274 in 1927 to 10,918 in 1933, and then almost tripled in the next seven years,
reaching 27,777 in 1940.
Margo has documented the lower incidence of unemployment among professional, technical, and managerial occupational classifications as compared,
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for example, with un skilled or blue-collar labor, or those with fewer year
of schooling (Margo, 1991). This is indirect evidence that the sharp increase
in R&D employment during the Depress ion was driven more by an outward shift in the demand for this type of labor than by a hift in its
supply.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the real net manufacturing
capital stock was le than 10 percent higher in 1941 than it had been in 1929,
while, according to Kendrick, hours had ri sen 15.5 percent over the same period
(Kendrick, 1961 , appendix, table D-II) . So, at the same time that the aggregate
capital labor ratio in the sector fell, the relative demand for scientists and engineers increased. During this period complementarity was between hi gh-end
labor and the disembodied technical change that was such an important feature
of the Depression years - a contrast with the capital-skill complementarity
emphasized by Goldin and Katz ( 1998).
Table 5.3 lists the eleven two-digit indu trie that employed at lea t 1,000
scientist and engineers in 1940. The chemical indu try tops the li st by a wide
margin, followed by electrical machinery and petroleum. These three industries alone account for almost half the total R&D employment on the eve of
the Second World War. Absent from the Ii tare tobacco, textiles, apparel, lumber, furniture, paper, publishing, and leather - industrie that, with the possible
exception of tobacco manufacture, one can identify with the fir t indu trial revolution, before the Civil War. Although the emphasis here is on R&D-inten ive
industries such as chemicals, which turned in stellar productivity result during the Depress ion , it should be noted that a number of these latter industrie ,
including tobacco and textiles, also turned in very respectable MFP performance
over the period.
The overall trends revealed in the employment data are echoed in other R&D
indicators. Between 1929 and 1936 the annual rate of founding of new R&D
labs (seventy-three) exceeded the comparable statistic between 1919 and 1928
(s ixty- ix), and real pending on R&D in manufacturing more than doubled
during the 1930 , with an acceleration at the end of the decade (Mowery and
Rosenberg, 2000, pp. 814, 819).
Between 1929 and 1941, as noted, MFP growth in manufacturing fell by
half compared with 1919- 1929 (see table 5.2). There are two closely related
questions here. On the one hand, why did MFP growth fall from 5 .12 percent per
year to 2.60 percent per year? The main explanation i that the across-the-board
gains from exploiting small electric motors, and reconfiguring factories from
the multi-story pattern that mechanical di tribution of team power required to
the one-story layout made possible by electrification, were nearing exhaustion
by the end of the 1920 . By 1929 79 percent of manufacturing horsepower in
the United States was already provided by electricity (Devine, 1983) . It ' not
that productivity level in manufacturing were going to fall as a result of thi s
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exhaustion , it's just that one could not hope to continue to generate 5 percent
per year growth in the residual from this source.
The related question, then, is, why didn ' t MFP growth in manufacturing
fall more? Here the answer has to do with the contributions of a maturing
and expanding privately funded re earch and development system that had
begun with Thomas Edison at Menlo Park. The lion's share of private R&D
spending was then - and i now - done in manufacturing, and a variety of new
technological paradigm , mo t notably in chemical engineering, were ripe for
exploitation.
The growing importance of the manufacturing ector - it generated about a
quarter of national income in 1929, almost a third in 1941 - helped counterbalance the within-sector decline in MFP growth in terms of the ability of the
sector to contribute to high and, indeed, accelerating MFP growth in the aggregate economy during the 1930s. Still, this roughly 2.6 percentage point decline
in the MFP growth rate in the ector worked in the opposite direction, reducing
the overall importance of manufacturing in aggregate MFP growth. Clearly, one
had to have substantial accelerations in MFP growth in other sectors in order
to produce the 2.31 percent continuously compounded growth rate reported in
table 5.1 for the private non-farm economy.
That acceleration came principally within transportation and public utilities
(about a tenth of the economy) and to a lesser degree within wholesale and retail
distribution (about a sixth of national income). The remaining ectors, on net,
contributed somewhat less. Agriculture i excluded from this analysis ince we
are examining the performance of the private non-farm economy, but we know
that the farm sector's productivity growth in the 1930s also lagged behind that
of the rest of the economy ( ee Field, 2003).
With the exception of water transport, productivity performance in transportation and public utilities between 1929 and 1941 was stellar (Field, 2006a).
Of the 4.67 percent per year MFP growth in the ector, trucking and warehousing accounted for almo t 40 percent of the total (1.80 percentage points),
railroad an additional 26 percent (1.22 percentage points). Thus, almo t twothird s of the sectoral advance took place in surface tran sportation, and trucking
and warehousing alone accounted for approximately 10 percent of MFP growth
in the entire PNE.
It is useful to contrast the effects of the boom in street, highway, and other
infrastructure construction during the 1930 with those of the rather different
government-financed capital formation boom that took place during the 1940s.
The latter effort poured more than $10 billion of taxpayer money into GOPO
(government owned, privately operated) plants. Almost all this infusion was
in manufacturing, and a large part went for equipment, particularly machine
tool , in such strategic sectors as aluminum, synthetic rubber, aircraft engines,
and aviation fuel refining (Gordon, 1969). Most of this was then sold off to the
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private ector after the war. Thi boom in equipment investment wa as ociated
with negative MFP growth in manufacturing between 1941 and 1948 and, partly
as a result, a slowdown in PNE MFP growth overall (see Field, 2005, 2006a) .
In contrast, the infrastructure pending during the 1930 had po itive pillovers
in the private sector, particularly in tran sportation and distribution.
The achievement of the 1930s built on foundations put in place during the
Depre ion year a well a work done in thel920s and earlier. By establishing
the groundwork for subsequent advance, the period also restocked the larder.
For example, almo tall the development work carried out by Philo Farnsworth
on the quintes ential po twar consumer commodity was carried out during the
Depre sion, upported by venture capital funding. The new product (television)
wa introduced to a wide public in 1939 at the New York World ' Fair, but the
demands of war forestalled its full exploitation until after 1948.
Overall , of the 2.3 1 percent CAAGR (compound average annual growth rate)
of MFP in the private non-farm economy between 1929 and 1941 , 48 percent
was contributed by manufacturing, 24 percent by tran port and public utilities,
and 18 percent by whole ale and retail di stribution, with the remainder of the
PNE contributing about 11 percent (see Field, 2006a).
We can now summarize the main di tinction between 1919- 1929 and 19291941 with re pect to aggregate MFP growth and its sources. First, MFP growth in
the 1920s was almo t entirely a story about manufacturing. Comparing the latter
with the earlier period, there was a ignificant drop in the share of MFP growth
in the private non-farm economy accounted for by manufacturing, from 84
percent in the 1920 to 48 percent in the 1929-1941 period. Thi was primari ly
due to a halving of within- ector MFP growth, only partially compensated for
by the expanding size of the manufacturing ector. There wa also a change
in the sources of advance - away from the one-time gains as ociated with the
final stages of electrification to those a ociated with exploiting the result of
organized and expanding re earch and development efforts. Thi interpretation
is supported by the aforementioned R&D employment and expenditure data
(see table 5.3 ) and by chronologies of major proces and product breakthroughs
(Kleinknecht, 1987; Mensch, 1979; Schmookler, 1966; Field, 2003), which all
show peaks during the 1930s, particularly its latter half.

5.5 The end-of-century episode
The aim of the second part of this chapter i to examine the end-of-century
epi ode in hi torical perspective, and, in particular, to consider how much of
the recent productivity growth and its acceleration should be credited to the
enabling technologies of the IT revolution. If we want to take the measure of
the IT revolution , we need to try and imagine a world in all respects similar
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save for the availability of these enabling technologies. In their absence, saving
flows would have been congealed in other not quite as good capital goods.
Output and productivity growth rates would have been somewhat lower, and
one would like to know by how much.
Common practice in e timating the IT revolution 's impact on labor productivity to date has been to sum three components: a contribution within the
IT-producing indu trie to MFP growth, a contribution within the IT-using
industries to MFP growth, and a portion of the effect on labor productivity of
capital deepening associated with the accumulation of IT capital (Oliner and
Sichel, 2000; Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003).
There can be few conceptual objections to the fir t two of these component .
We should credit to the enabling technologies most of the MFP growth in
the semiconductor and computer/network equipment manufacturing industries
(SIC 35 and 36) and, where it can be demon trated, a portion of non-cyclical
MFP growth in IT-using indu tries such as securities trading and wholesale and
retail di stribution. The inclusion of the third component is more problematic,
although it is endorsed by many, including Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995,
p. 352) and Kienow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997, p. 608).
The objection to including a portion of the capital deepening effect is thi .
What one is trying to do here i to estimate the ocial aving of the IT revolution.
In its absence, saving flows would have been congealed in a lightly less beneficial array of phy ical capital good . One wants to emphasize that breakthroughs
uch as the integrated circuit, and continuing advances in the manufacture of
semiconductors, display screens, and mass torage devices, have saved us real
reso urces in generating quality-adjusted IT ervice . We will pick that up in
MFP growth in the IT-producing sectors. The very rapid MFP growth in these
sectors is indeed the reason why the relative prices of semiconductors and goods
embodying them have plummeted. 6
We al o want to ask whether the fact that aving flows were congealed in thi s
slightly superior range of physical capital goods, as opposed to others, enabled
a set of resource saving in other part of the economy. This we will pick up in
MFP growth in the IT-using sector (the e are typically referred to as pillovers
or productive externalities).
But, unles we can make the argument that the enabling technologies of IT
raised the rate of return to new inve tment project at the margin , and that
there was a response of aggregate saving rates to thi rise, the capital deepening effect should ultimately be credited to saving behavior, and not to the
enabling technologie .7 It is, of course, conceivable that the enabling technologies of the IT revolution led, by raising the incremental return to investment and
perforce saving, or by redistributing income to hou eholds with higher saving
propensities, to an increase in the total flow of accumulation as a percentage
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of GDP at either the US or the world level, in which case it becomes more
difficult cleanly to distinguish between the role of aving and technical change
in fostering labor productivity growth.
The evidence i , however, that investment in these good did not crowd out
consumption goods. Rather, it crowded out other not quite a good capital
goods both within the United States and outside the country. Although we can
comfortably posit an upward influence of IT innovations on marginal returns
to investment and thu saving (this was, after all, the rationalization for ri ing
tock market values during the 1990 ), we would also need to argue, in order
to justify the inclu ion of the third component, that saving responded. And we
would be hard-pressed to do so.
There is a large literature on the re ponsivenes of saving to after-tax interest
rates. Theoretically, a in the case of the re pon e of labor supply to increases
in after-tax wages, there i the possibility of both an income and a ubstitution
effect. Empirically, the evidence is inconclu ive, although con i tent with a
conclusion of little net effect. As far as the income di tribution mechanism,
there is no question that there was a trend towards greater inequality in the
last quarter of the century, particularly in the United States, and marked by a
widening gap in the wage of highly and le highly educated workers. But
there is no evidence that this redistribution resulted in an increase in private
sector saving rates .
Some argued, particularly in the late 1990s, that saving rates were improperly
measured because they did not include unrealized capital gains. But the conventionally measured aving rate was largely invariant both to the expansion of
stock market valuation in the 1990s and their collapse in the early twenty-first
century.
Between 1995 and 2000 consumption spending in the Un ited States increased
by 34 percent, from 4,969 billion to $6,683 .7 billion nominal. 8 Consumption
ro e not just ab olutely but a a share of a ri ing GDP, from 67 .2 percent to 68
percent. At the same time, the growth of IT capital ervices accelerated from
0.41 percent per year (1973- 1995) to 1.03 percent per year (1995-2000). Part of
this acceleration came at the expense of the services of other component of the
tock within the United States , the growth of which declined from 0.30 percent
per year in the earlier period to 0.06 percent per year (US Council of Economic
Advisors, 2001 , p. 29). How was the boom in capital formation, much of it 1T
capital, financed?
Table 5.4 shows that between 1995 and 2000 there was a 611 .6 billion
increase in gross private domestic investment as well as an increase in government investment of $81.6 billion. How was this financed? Not by an increase
in personal saving, which fell by a third , or by retained busine s aving (net
bu iness saving), which fell by a quarter. Gros business saving rose, however,
as a consequence of a 274.3 billion increase in corporate and unincorporated
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Table 5.4 Changes in the uses and sources of saving in the United States,

1995-2000

1995
Gross private domestic investment
Gros, government inve tment
Per onal sav ing
Retai ned bu siness earnin gs
Deprec iation allowance
Gross busi ness sav inga
Gross governme nt sav ing
Net foreig n inves tme nt
Statistical discrepancy
Tota ls

1143.8
238.2
302.4
203.6
743.6
963.6
- 8.5
- 98.0
26.5

2000
l 755.4

3 19.8
20 1.5
152.6
1017.9
1170.5
435.8
- 395 .8
- 128.5

uses

C hange in
ources

611.6
81.6
- 100.9

693 .2

206.9
444.3
297.8
- 155.0
693. 1

Inc ludes wage acc ru al and di sbursements not how n separate ly.
B: All numbers are billi ons of dollars, nomina l. Thi table i based on a rea rrangement
of the open eco nom y investment savings identity. Private domestic investment mu st
be fina nced by the sum of private dom estic saving, government saving, and inflows
of foreig n sav ing (capita l acco unt urplus or c urre nt account de fi c it). Note th at negative net fore ign investment is entered as a pos iti ve numbe r in the so urce of avi ng
co lumn .
Source: US Council of Economic Advi sor (2003, tabl e B-32).
a

capital consumption allowances . This reflected the large portion of the gross
investment surge comprised of relatively hart-lived IT capital goods, which
increased the importance of short-lived capital goods in the capital stock. We
thus experienced a net change in gross private sav ing of $106.1 billion .
The increase in gross domestic investment wa $693 .2 billion . After taking
into account the effect of changes in gross private saving, a aving gap of
almost $600 billion remain . It was filled through two main mechani sm . Fir t,
a movement in the consolidated government urplu s from -$8 .5 to $435.8
billion - a sw ing of $444.3 billion in the urplu direction, and , second , a
deterioration ofnet exports from a deficit of $38 billion to one of $395 .8 billion,
a sw ing of $297.8 billion. The remaining gap between the changes in the ource
and uses of sav ing is accounted for by an increa e of $ 155 billion in the statistical
di screpancy.
The end-of-century inve tment boom wa enabled on the one hand by the
willingness of foreign wealth holders to divert their saving flow from investment in their own countrie or el ewhere and make it available to the United
States, and on the other hand by the tax policie of the Clinton admini stration
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and the second half of the George W. Bu h administration. Their fiscal policies,
in particular modest tax increases in conjunction with an economy operating at
close to capacity, provided the foundation for the big increase in government
saving.
It is conceivable that, although the IT accumulation spurt was not associated
with a rise in the private saving rate within the United States, it was associated
with a rise in the world saving rate. This seems unlikely, and no one has made
this case. We are left with the conclusion that, by and large, the IT capital
accumulation spurt in the United States represented a sub titution not away
from consumption but away from other not quite as good capital goods, both
within the United States and abroad.
Whether the flows nece sary to finance capital accumulation came from
national saving or from outside the country is irrelevant from the standpoint of
productivity trends within the United States. But it does have welfare implications, particularly for the future. Reliance on foreign borrowing meant that the
United States was able to forgo the sacrifice of current consumption that would
otherwise have been the price of capital deepening. The borrowing will turn
out to have been a good deal for the country if the increases in output per hour
associated with the additional capital deepening exceed the increases in debt
service per hour of labor input. But there i no guarantee that this will be the
case; it depends on how much of the additional investment turns out to have
been well directed. In any event, the gains in output per hour obtained through
foreign borrowing will not be manna from heaven, given the obligation of debt
repayment.
Within the United States there was indubitably an acceleration in overall
capital deepening, comparing 1995- 2000 with 1973-1995. Capital services
per quality-adjusted hour grew at 2.93 percent per year in the latter period,
as compared with 1.96 percent per year in the former. Thus , the slowdown in
non-IT capital accumulation was more than compensated for by the rising rate
of IT capital accumulation. One could argue that the drop in US private saving
simply compensated collectively for the rise in government saving. But thi s
seems doubtful, since the saving rate ha been trending downwards for decades
through periods of government deficit and surplus. It is more likely that, in the
absence of the tax increases of the early 1990s, the deterioration of the current
account would have been even worse.
If the enabling technologies of the IT revolution diverted towards the United
States some portion of world saving flows that would not otherwise have come
this way even though VS and world saving rates remained largely unaffected
and may actually have declined, it would technically be correct to say that we
should grant to the IT revolution that part of the growth in labor productivity
associated with IT's share of capital deepening. But, if we care about labor
productivity because we care ultimately about consumption per person in the
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United States, this i a mi leading calculation. Much of the capital deepening
has associated with it a liability tied to increased foreign indebtedne . This is
in sharp contrast with the contributions to labor productivity growth of the first
two components of the traditional triad used to measure IT "contributions."

5.6 The IT contribution and social saving controversies
The framework for reckoning the impact of the IT revolution advocated in this
chapter, particularly it emphasis on MFP to the exclusion of the portion of the
increase in labor productivity attributable to IT ' share of capital deepening,
runs counter to current practice. It can be better appreciated by comparing the
challenge of coming to terms with IT in the 1990s with one of the critical
di putes that gave ri se to the new economic history. This involved the attempt
to estimate the social aving of the US railroads. W. W. Rostow ( 1960) argued
that railroads were " indi pensable" to American economic growth. Both Albert
Fishlow (1965) and Robert Fogel (1964) wanted more preci ion . They tried
to imagine world otherwise similar save for access to the blueprints needed
to build railroads. They calculated alternative channels for saving flow (into
canal building and river dredging, for example) and ultimately how much lower
US GDP would have been in this alternative world.
The social savings calculations that came out of those debates four decades
ago were designed to impre upon u fir t of all the fact that, because saving
flows were congealed in railroad permanent way and rolling stock, as opposed
to other forms of physical capital uch a canal , GDP was indeed higher than it
otherwise would have been. But not by a whole lot. Fogel argued, for example,
that 1890 US GDP wa about 4 percent higher than it would have been in the
absence of the availability of the railroad. What kind of an increment to MFP
over a quarter of a century would one have needed to produce a GDP (or output
per hour) in 1890 4 percent higher than it otherwise would have been? About
0.15 percent per year, continuou ly compounded.
In fac t, Abramovitz ' and Kendrick ' analyses of nineteenth-century growth
after the Civ ii War suggest, as was true for the 1973-1995 period , that, at least up
until 1889, almost all the growth in real output can be accounted for by growth
in inputs conventionally measured. It would make little ense to suggest that we
have underestimated the contribution of the availability of railroad blueprints
to growth in living standards in the nineteenth century because we have not
accounted for the share of the increment to output per hour attributable to that
portion of capital deepening associated with investments in locomotives, rolling
stock, and permanent way. 9
The key mes age of the classic works by Fishlow and Fogel was that, in the
absence of the railroad, saving flows would have been congealed elsewhere,
with results for the economy that would have been almost, but not quite, as
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good. We should take the same approach to reckoning the importance of the IT
revolution.
In defense of what ha become the conventional approach, some labor productivity is certainly, in an accounting sense, attributable to capital deepening.
And a large fraction of the capital deepening, particularly at the end of the 1990s,
was indeed associated with the accumulation of physical IT goods: com puters,
servers, fiber optic cable, routers, etc. 10 But, since the counterfactual suggested
here imagines saving behavior largely unaffected by the pre ence or absence
of the IT blueprints, our estimate of the portion of labor productivity growth
attributable to sav ing (as opposed to technical innovation) should be large ly
independent of the particular forms in which sav ing flows were congealed.
It should, to be fair, also be independent of the sources of that saving. With
respect to the labor productivity growth caused by capital deepening, it i irrelevant whether the aving came from outside the country. But, from the standpoint
of their contribution to US tandard of living, labor productivity gains from
capital deepening financed by foreign borrowing come encumbered in a way
that similar gains financed by dome tic aving do not.
It is true that, if we are operating below capacity, and a new attractive invention offers profitable opportunities for new investment, it is reasonable to talk
about the extent to which the innovation increa e real output through its effect
on the amount of real capital formation . From an aggregate perspective, such
inve tment will be largely self-financing Uust as, in the presence of accommodative monetary policy, will be government deficits). Under these circumstances,
we can argue that it is inve tment that drive saving.
But, once the economy reaches potential output, the old rules of microeconomics again apply. Choices have opportunity costs, and saving constrain s
investment rather than the other way around. Thi has always been the rationale
for policy changes designed to increase the after-tax return to sav ing, and , if the
elasticities are right, saving flow s - policies that make sense from a long-range
growth perspective but are contra-indicated if one is below capacity. By and
large, in growth accounting one tries to abstract from cyclical effect , and study
the effect of saving and innovation on the increa e of potential output. We want
to know, in the long run , what the effect of the IT-enabling technologi e is on the
growth of potential output. If we are concerned with contributions to long-run
growth, an appeal to the role of IT capital formation role in "contributing" to
increases in real output based on these Keynesian arguments is mi placed.
It is analogous to emphasizing, as did Ro tow, the stimulus to the iron and steel
and lumber industries caused by late nineteenth-century railroad construction.
That emphasis obscured the fact that, once the economy was at potenti al output.
these resources had alternate uses, and the enormous costs of constructing the
railroads raised the hurdle they had to overcome to make a positive contribution to GDP. They managed to do so, as Fogel and Fi shlow demon trated, by
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speeding up the turnover of inventories in the economy and by enabling a
superior exploitation of regional comparative advantage. But it wa close.

5. 7 MFP growth versus the capital deepening effect
How important, in term of their impact on labor productivity, were the respective roles of MFP and capital deepening over the 1995-2000 period? There are
a co upl e of way of looking at thi s. The fir tis to ask how much of the acceleration in labor productivity growth each is responsible for. For the private
non-farm economy, that acceleration , comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-1995 ,
was 1.09 percentage points, and about three-quarter of thi s is attributable to
MFP acceleration .
The contribution to the output per hour growth of the labor composition
change was about the ame during the two periods ( li ghtly lower between 1995
and 2000) . Comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-1995 , capital erv ices growth
accelerated from 3.94 percent per year to 5.38 percent per year. Growth in
hours rose from 1.58 to 2.09 percent per year. As a result, the rate of capital
deepening increased from 2.36 to 3.28 percent per year between 1995 and 2000.
But, ass uming a capital share of 0.3 2, 11 this 0.92 percentage point increase
should have acco unted for an increase in the growth of output per hour of a
modest 0.29 percentage points. In fact, the growth of output per hour rose 1.09
percentage points, from 1.37 to 2.46 percent per year. Almost all the balance about three-quarter of the total - was due to MFP acceleration. 12
A second approach is to ask what portion of labor productivity growth (2.46
percent per year) each is responsible for. Between 1995 and 2000 MFP growth
was 1.14 percent per year. The rate of capital deepening was 3.28 percent per
year. Multiplied by 0.3 2, thi s yields a capital deepening contribution of 1.05
percent per year. The remainder, about 0. 27 percent per year, is the contribution
of labor quality improvement. Looked at from thi s perspective, we can ay that
MFP growth acco unted for less than half - about 46 percent (l .14/2.46) - of
labor productivity growth between 1995 and 2000. Table 5.5 summ ari zes these
calculations.
There is no hard and fast guide to what metric we should prefer here, although
for an individual country it seems to me that the more meaningful measure is
IT 's contribution to the rate of improvement, not the rate of improvement of the
rate of improvement, of labor productivity. For comparisons between countries,
we should also be interested in levels.

5.8 MFP growth in the IT-producing and -using sectors

In spite of the variou s frameworks that re earchers have used to measure the
overall impact of IT on productivity growth, there is now enough consensus to
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Table 5.5 The MFP contribution to labor productivity growth and
acceleration in the United States, 1995- 2000
Labor productivity growth, l 995-2000a
MFPa
Capital deepeninga
Labor compositiona

2.46
1.14
1.05
0.26
1.09
0.76
0.32
- 0.01

Labor productivity growth acceleration, 1995-2000 v . l 973-l 995 b
MFPb
Capital deepeningb
Labor compositionb
aPercent per year.
bPercentage points.
NB: Components do not sum exactly to aggregates due to rounding errors.

Table 5.6 Contributions to labor productivity acceleration in the United States

Total acceleration
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
SIC 35 (incl udes sem iconductors)
SIC 36 (includes computers)
Securities trading

1995- 1999 over
1987-1995

1995-2000 over
1975- 1989

1.33
0.37
0.34
0.12
0.17
0.25

1.61
0.27
0.46
0.23
0.08
0.32

NB: All figures are percentage points.
Sources: McKinsey Global Institute (2002); Nordhaus (2002, table 6, p. 233).

make some non-controversial statements about trends in MFP growth and their
sources at the end of the century. First, in spite of ome initial keptici sm (see
Jorgen on and Stiroh, 2000), it is clear that MFP growth - and, largely because
of it, labor productivity growth-did accelerate between 1995 and 2000. Second,
it is generally agreed that an important contributor to labor productivity growth
and its acceleration was MFP advance associated with technical change in the
semiconductor industry and in the manufacture of such products as computers,
networking devices, and telecommunications equipment that embodied them .
This shows up in very rapid (and accelerating) rates of MFP growth in SIC 35
and 36.
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Third, it i likely, although the inference are more indirect and the statistical upport weaker, that some of the IT-u ing sectors, in particular wholesale and retail trade and securities trading, began to throw off significant MFP
growth. Two analyses of the contributions to the acceleration of labor productivity growth (McKinsey Global In titute, 2002, and Nordhaus, 2002; see
also US Council of Economic Advisors, 2001) are suggestive. The McKinsey
study focuses on four year 'growth ( 1995- 1999) whereas Nordhau cover five
( 1995-2000), and the base periods on which the acceleration i calculated differ.
Both rely on BEA value-added data in the numerator, although the McKinsey
study uses per ons employed rather than hours in the denominator.
Both neverthele s find that distribution contributed substantially to the acceleration of labor productivity growth , and sub tantially more than did manufacturing, although the two studie reverse the relative contribution of whole ale
and retail trade on the one hand, and SIC 35 and 36 on the other. Of course, one
can 't reason directly from decompositions of labor productivity acceleration
to conclusions about MFP acceleration. Rate of capital deepening may have
been exceptionally rapid in these sector , explaining much of the acceleration
of labor productivity growth. Indeed, at least through 2000, the data support
thi view.
Distribution was an extremely heavy user of IT capital. Largely as a consequence, its overall use of capital services oared. An index of capital services
input in whole ale di tribution rose 18.8 percent a year between 1973 and 1995
and 20.5 percent a year between 1995 and 2000. Hours in wholesale rose only
1.32 percent per year from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, capital deepened in the
sector at a rate of 19 .2 percent per year over the la t five years of the century, far higher than the average for the economy. Similar calculations for retail
distribution show capital deepening at 15.3 percent per year over these years. 13
The BLS " industry productivity indexe and values table" shows labor productivity growth in wholesale trade rising from 2.82 percent per year (19871995) to 4.17 percent per year (1995-2000). In retail trade the comparable
number are 1.95 percent per year (1987- 1995) to 3.72 percent per year (19952000). So labor productivity growth in distribution did accelerate.
The problem for the residual is that, assuming a capital share of 0.32, the
very high rates of capital deepening more than account for the labor productivity
growth , implying negative MFP growth in both sector overall. Moreover, this
negative growth accelerated in the 1995- 2000 period, along with the acceleration in capital deepening. The bottom line is that, while heavy capital deepening
in di stribution did cause an acceleration in labor productivity growth in the sector, it i uncertain whether the results through 2000 fully ju tify the massive IT
expenditure.
Some of this uncertainty and pe imism may be due to an overe timate of
how much "true" computer prices dropped, and thus an overestimate of how
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much real IT output (and investment) grew. Thi is a controver ial uggestion,
since a number of economi ts have actively press ured the BLS to make more use
of hedonic methods to estimate the rate of quality improvement (and implied
price decline) and praised it for what efforts it has made (see, for example,
Nordhaus, 1997a).
The most compelling argument as to why these methods might lead to some
overestimate of real product growth is that, in products where the quality has
improved , users are typically forced to purchase bundle of attributes, not all
of which they may actually de ire or value. No one di sputes that the iss ues
of quality improvement and the introduction of new products are important
challenges in constructing realistic estimates of real product growth. But some
of the resulting estimates do not seem to atisfy a reasonableness test.
Hedonic price technique have yielded end-of-century estimates in the range
of - 27 percent per year for the rate of decrea e of quality-adju ted computer
prices (Berndt, Dulberger, and Rapaport, 2000). Thi rate of price decrease
would reduce a 1999 computer priced at $2000 to $500 over five year . Thu ,
if one used a laptop in 1999 and another in 2004 elling at the ame nominal
price, the BEA would conclude, based on the price data received from the BLS ,
that there had been a fourfo ld increase in the ratio of capital service to hours
in one 's work. Readers can judge, based on their own experience, whether or
not this is reasonable.
For the sake of argument, grant that the BLS e ti mates of the rates of decline of
IT capital prices may have re ulted in an overestimate by the BEA ofreal product
growth in the sector. Although thi s would, of cour e, boo t MFP growth in the
IT-producing sector , it has the effect of worsening it in IT-using industries.
One of the advantage of adopting the framework for reckoning the importance
of IT proposed in thi s chapter is the elimination of the possible " incentive" to
push for more rapid rates of estimated price dec line to make IT 's contribution
appear larger.
Overestim ating the real growth of IT serv ice will, of course, also overestimate the capital deepening component of its contributions within what has
become the convention al triadic approach. Since the framework advocated in
thi chapter credits most of the effect of capital deepening on labor productivity
to sav ing, rather than the availability of IT technology, one is left with the effect
on MFP growth in the IT-producing sector , plu the effect in the IT-using
ectors, such as di stribution, if it can be demon trated. An overestim ate of real
IT output growth will increa e the former component, while it will reduce the
latter. The two effects may largely cancel out. 14
For the anal y is of smaller subsectors of the economy, however, the effects
wi ll not cancel out, and the standard value-added approach as applied to subectors has been criticized prec isely because it can be o sensitive to errors
in deflation (see Basu and Fe rnald , 1995). For subsectors the BLS prefers its
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KLEMS (capital, labour, energy, material , ervice ) methodology, whi ch uses
growth of gro output rather than value-added meas ure, and subtracts weighted
input growth rate for purchased material s, energy, and business serv ices as well
as hours and capital input. Their MFP estimates for the sector are unpubli shed
and incomplete. But the unoffic ial data show MFP rising at 0.8 percent a year in
whol esale although not at all in retail between l 992 and 1997. 15 It is likely that,
were data available through 2000, calculated rates of growth of MFP between
1995 and 2000 would be higher.
With respect to retail di stribution , the McKinsey study argue that virtually all
the gains in labor productivity have been attributable to " big box" retailers such
as Costco, Wal-Mart, and Circuit City. And it is the relative ease with which these
can be put in place in the United States, as compared with the relative difficulty
with which thi s can be done in Europe and other parts of the world, that Gordon
has c ited as a principal explanation of cross-country differences in MFP growth
in distribution, and , perforce, the economy as a whole (Gordon , 2003a). 16
Although the McKinsey group was willing to lay at IT 's doorstep only about
half the gains in whole ale and retail di stribution (ass uming one could demon strate them), it is important to keep in mind that these were gains in labor productivity. The evidence for uncompen sated productivity spillovers- increases in
value added attributable to IT that aren't captured by the equipment or software
manufacturer - is still weak. There are enough straw in the wind, however, to
spec ul ate that we are in fact in the midst of a second IT revolution in di stribution, a revolution the trace of which on sector MFP data has been temporaril y
clouded, or even obliterated, by the over-deflation of IT price . 17

5.9 Summary: the 1990s and the 1930s
Let's now try and bring together what we can ay about the 1995-2000 episode .
and how it relates to the 1929- 1941 period. In thi s instance, because of the
paucity of di saggregated sectoral data outside of manufacturing, I divide the
private non-farm economy into three subsectors: manufacturing, wholesale and
retail trade, and other. Excluding agriculture, government, non-farm hou sin g,
and the non-profit sector, the private non-farm economy accounts fo r 72.4 percent of value added. Using year 2000 sectoral shares, one can calculate a man ufac turing weight (share of PNE) of 0 .214 and a wholesale and retail trade
weight of 0.223.
Again, the calculations begin with BLS numbers for MFP growth for the
PNE between 1995 and 2000 (1 .14 percent per year), and the BLS estimate
fo r manufacturing a a whole of 2.08 percent per year (see tables 5.1 and
5.2). For whol esale and retail trade, one lack data on MFP growth. As noted ,
unpubli shed estimate u ing the KLEMS methodology show 0.8 percent per
year between 1992 and 1997 in whole ale, and no growth in retail. Allowing for
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Table 5.7 Sectoral contributions to MFP growth in the United States,

1995- 2000

Share of PNE
Manufacturing
Trade
Other
Total

0.214
0.223
0.563
1.000

Sectoral MFP
growth

Contribution to
PNE MFP growth

Share of PNE
MFP growth

2.08
0.70
0.94

0.45
0. 16
0.53
1.14

0 .39
0. 14
0.47

NB : " Private non-farm economy" exc ludes non-farm housing, health , agriculture, and
government, which leaves 72.4 percent of value added. Thi s is approximately the BLS 's
current definition of the PNE.
Sources: Sectoral shares - www.bea.doc.gov ; MFP growth in manufacturing - see
table 5.2; MF in trade - see text.

some acceleration towards the end of the decade in both wholesale and retail ,
and considering the relative weights of wholesale and retail, one can hazard an
estimate of 0.7 percent per year for the sector between 1995 and 2000.
Multiplying sectoral shares by sectoral MFP growth rates, one can estimate
that of the 1.14 percent per year growth of MFP within the PNE between 1995
and 2000, 0.45 percentage points originated in manufacturing, most of it due to
the IT-producing industries, and 0.14 percentage points in distribution. Given
the rest of the PNE's weight of 0.563 , we can back out an implied MFP growth
within it of 0.94 percent per year contributing the remaining 0.53 percentage
points. This "other" category includes stand-out sectors such as securities trading, as well as laggards such as construction and trucking. Table 5. 7 summarizes
these calculations.
Suppose that one now credits all of the MFP growth in manufacturing between
1995 and 2000 to the enabling technologies of the IT revolution, and a third
of that in distribution and the rest of the economy. 18 We would then conclude
that 0.68 percentage points of the 1.14 percent MFP growth between 1995 and
2000 could be credited to IT innovations. Thus, we would attribute about 28
percent of labor productivity growth between 1995 and 2000 (0.68/2.46 percent
per year) to the enabling technologie of the IT revolution.
How does this analysis compare with the recent decomposition by Jorgenson ,
Ho, and Stiroh (2003)? First, the BLS data for the private non-farm economy
cover less than three-quarter of their aggregate. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh
include what the BLS excl udes: the farm sector, government, housing, and (presumably) the non-profit sector. 19 These excluded sectors were slower-growing,
and as a consequence their output aggregate grows at 4.07 percent between 1995
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and 2000, versus 4.54 percent for the BLS PNE. Their hours series grows at
1.99 percent versu 2.09 percent for the PNE. Their labor quality adjustment i
al o lower: 0.22 percent versus 0.37 percent per year. Finally, their MFP growth
estimate is much lower (0.62 versus 1.14) and their output per hour rises more
slowly (2.07 percent ver us 2.46 percent) (Jorgen on, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003,
table 2). The difference in labor productivity growth rates is less than the difference in MFP growth rate because their implied rate of capital deepening (3.88
percent per year) i higher than for the BLS PNE (3.28).
All these comparisons speak to the extent to which the ectors excluded by
the BLS and added back in by Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) tend to be slowergrow ing and, in the aggregate, relatively unprogressive technologically.
Of their 2.02 percent per year growth in labor productivity between 1995 and
2000, they attribute 0.85 percentage points to IT capital deepening and 0.45 percentage points to IT-related MFP growth. In other words, they "attribute" about
two-thirds of labor productivity growth (l .30/2.02 = 0.64) to IT. Conceptually,
their analysis is more favorable to IT becau e, like Oliner and Sichel (2000),
they credit the sector with a (large) portion of the effect on labor productivity of
capital deepening. But in another respect their approach is less favorable than
that advocated in this chapter, because they credit IT innovations with none of
the MFP growth outside the IT-producing ectors, even though, in contrast to
some of their earlier analyses, they do now acknowledge some MFP growth
in the rest of the economy. If one applied my framework to their data, one
would add the 0.45 percentage points of IT-related MFP growth and a third
of the "other" MFP growth (0.17 /3 = 0.056) to obtain 0.51 out of a total of
2.02 percent per year attributable to the enabling technologies of IT. This is
approx imately one-quarter of the total.
Comparing "new economy" economic growth with the MFP boom period of
the interwar years, the following conclusions tand out. The l 920s, the 1930s,
and the 1990s all saw contributions to MFP growth from manufacturing but
the percentage point contribution to PNE growth in the recent episode was
much lower (0.45 percentage points per year, versus 1.24 percentage points
per y'ear between 1929 and 1941 and 1.69 percentage points in the 1919- 1929
period. Although rapid MFP advance within manufacturing was somewhat more
localized in the 1930 than it had been in the 1920s, it was very narrowly
concentrated at the end of the century.
Distribution played an important role in both the 1930 and the 1990s,
although its percentage point contribution wa three times larger in the Depre sion. Perhaps most striking, however, in comparison with the 1930 , the 1990s
lacked the broad-based and very rapid advance in transportation and public
utilities that characterized the 1930s. Although ectoral MFP estimates are
not available across the board, labor productivity data, such as that contained
in US Council of Economic Advisors , 2001, how growth rates declining,
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comparing 1995-1999 with 1989- 1995, in trucking and warehousing, communications, and electric, gas, and sanitary services. For trucking and warehousing, labor productivity actually fell (US Council of Economic Advisors, 2001 ,
table 1.2).
Finally, we need to re-emphasize that, for the private non-farm economy as a
whole, aggregate MFP advance in the 1929-1941 period was more than twice
as fast a in 1995-2000, more than three times a fast as in 1989-2000. For the
1930s, the question of whether or not to include a technology-driven capital
deepening effect on labor productivity is moot, since there was effectively no
capital deepening, at least in the private sector.

5.10 Taking the measure of the IT revolution
What has been incontrovertibly revolutionary about the IT revolution has been
the operation of Moore 's law: the ability to manufacture computers, peripherals, and telecommunications equipment in such a fashion that output has risen
much more rapidly than inputs conventionally measured. The plummeting costs
of producing quality-adjusted central processing units and memory, mass storage, and display devices have been for the late twentieth century an even more
dramatic version of what spinning jennies and water frames were for the late
eighteenth century in Britain. There is some evidence that the rate of technical
progress in semiconductors accelerated even further after 1995 , as the interval required to double performance dropped from eighteen months to twelve
months. The revolutionary character of advances in the IT industries shows
up as higher and accelerating MFP and, perforce, labor productivity growth in
SIC 35 and 36. Even allowing for the possibility of some overshooting in the
estimate of output growth resulting from the use of hedonic techniques, we can
happily and uncontroversially credit the revolution with the e gains, which flow
directly through to improvements in the material standard of living.
It is also likely that some - although by no means all - of the MFP advance
in wholesale and retail distribution, securities trading, and some other sectors
of the economy was made pos ible by IT investment , and we should credit the
enabling technologies of the IT revolution with an appropriate share of these
gains as well, where we can demonstrate them. But, because the IT-producing
sectors are small in relation to the aggregate economy, and because the gain in
the IT-using sectors have been somewhat more mode t, the boost to the growth
of overall output per hour remains modest in comparison, for example, with the
impact of MFP growth in the 1930s
Thi s accounting doe not attribute a portion of the effect of capital deepening
to IT innovation - arguing that this is attributable to saving. An objection is
that technical improvement, whatever its sources, might have affected saving
behavior by raising the rate of return to incremental investments and thu s,
assumi ng there were a positive elasticity of the saving rate with respect to the
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real after-tax interest rate, an increase in sav ing flows. Or, because of a bias in
technical change, capital's share might have ri sen, leading to a redistribution
of income, to hou eholds with higher sav ing propensities. Versions of the e
arguments have been made for the period after the Civil War in the United States,
when , it has been sugge ted , such innovations as the railroad and Bes emer and
Siemens Martin teel elicited an upward surge in aggregate sav ing behavior that
propelled the economy to hi gher labor productivity levels as predicted by the
Solo model (David, 1977; Williamson , 1973 , p. 591). 20
The e was indeed an acceleration of gro s capital formation in the last half of
the 199 s, associated with a more than doubling of real investment in computers,
telecom equipment, and software between 1995 and 2000.2 1 And the national
sav ing r te did rise , barely, because government saving compensated for a
conti nued decline in private sector saving. It i doubtful that private sav ing
rates fe ll because tax rates were rai sed (the Ricardian equivalence argument),
since sav ing rates fell in the last quarter of the century through periods of
government deficit and surplu s alike. And no one ha claimed that the changes
in fiscal policies in the early 1990s that led to a ri se in government saving were
a re ponse to IT innovations, a a ri e in the private sav ing rate might have been.
Finally, the gap between private aving and national investment not filled by the
increase in government . aving was fi ll ed by a diver ion of aving flow s from
ou tside the country toward the United States, not necessarily an augmentation
of the world sav ing rate.
These are the grounds for attributing the effect of capital deepening on labor
productivity largely to the forces of thrift rather than innovation. In the absence
of IT, saving flows wou ld have bee n congealed in a set of not quite as good
capital good - an argument that can be, and has been, made for the railroad in
the nineteenth century.
Many of the frameworks used to guide thinking about the impact of the IT
revo lution were developed during a period of sustained stock market exuberance
when there wa enormous press ure among academics and within government
stati stical offices to resolve the Solow paradox (computers were showing up
everywhere but in the productivity tati tic .) We need to make ure that our
vi ion is not clouded by the legacies of the IT publi c relations offensives of the
1990.
One manifestation of the effectivenes of that campaign ha been a change in
the way that government stati tic on fixed assets are collected , classified, and
presented. In the BEA 's " Fixed Asset Tables," for example, the a et produced
by information technology industries are now listed first , in separate and detailed
categories . But why are sav ing flow s congealed in IT goods and software more
or less important than those congealed in structures, machine tool , vehicl e ,
nucl ear fuel rod , or any of the other fixed asset categories? One might reply,
" Because IT i a special type of capital good , one with a greater propensity
to can-y or embody or stimulate technical innovation within using sectors."
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A problem with thi argument is that the rise in the eq uipment share in capital
formation in the United States, which began after the Second World War (Field,
2006b), has been associated with a generally declining rate of MFP growth. To
the degree that it is true, we will pick up the e effects in MFP growth within
the IT-u ing sectors.
Another intellectual legacy of the IT boom ha been the widespread and
large ly uncritical acceptance of the usefulne s of the concept of a general purpose technology and the recognition of IT or computers as its principal instantiation (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). While it is undoubtedly true that
some advances are more important than other , to call omething a GPT has, in
many in tance , been to suggest about a class of innovations or industrie that
there was more to them than apparently met the eye, or showed up in aggregate
tatistics. The enthusiasm for the concept run the danger of placing too much
empha i on specific innovations awarded this designation.
One of the difficulties with GPTs is the potential multiplicity of candidates.
Steam , electricity, and IT are mo t freq uently identified, but chem ical engineering, the internal combustion engine, radio transmission and the assemb ly line
have all also been mentioned. The identification of one or several GPT often
offers an appealing narrative hook, but the criteria for designating them are not
universally agreed upon , in pite of continuing efforts to nai l them down. For
example, why isn't the railroad also a GPT? Gordon (see chapter 8) sugge t
that u e by both hou seholds and industry is a criterion. This work fo r electricity
and the internal combustion engine. But steam?
Here is another concern. Be emer and Siemen Martin processes were
industry-specific, and would clearly not pa s mu ter a GPT . They offered ,
to u e Dav id 's words, "complete, elf-contained and immediately applicable
solutions" (2004, p. 22). Thi was not the case for the product the production
of which they enabled. Does that make steel a GPT? It took Carnegie and
others time to persuade users that they hould make kyscraper , plate hips,
and replace iron rail s with it. Cheap steel in turn encouraged complementary
innovations such as, in the case of taller buildings, elevators.
If one follows the impact of product and proce innovations far enough
through the input-output table, one will eventually find products or technological complexes u ed as inputs in many other sectors, with the potenti al to generate spillover effect in u ing sectors. These processes, products, or complexes
are the consequence of many eparate breakthrough as well a learning by
doing, much of which has been sector-specific. IT, for example, has required
advances in software, ector- pecific emicond uctor manufacturing, and the
thin film technology and mechanical engineering that underlies most mass
torage.
Because of the potential for multipl ying GPT cand idacies and the lack of
an authoritative tribunal applying uniform rules pa sing judgment about wh ich
ones qualify, economic and technological history may well be better off without
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the concept. Our enthusiasm for GPTs suggests that we may till not have
absorbed entirely the lessons of the Ro tow- Fogel- Fi hlow debate about the
" indi spensability" of the railroad. Whereas IT has probably been responsible for
a larger increase in MFP growth between 1995 and 2000 than was the rai lroad
in the twenty-five years after the Civil War (compare here the e tim ate of 0 .15
percent per year for the railroad with the 0.68 percent per year I attribute to
IT between 1995 and 2000), overall MFP advance at the end of the twenti eth
centu ry was still much lower than it had been during the 1930s.
It is important to di stingui sh between the propo ition that it ometime takes
a long time for the productivity benefits of new technological complexes to be
reaped and the concept of a OPT. One can accept the former without necessarily
embrac ing the usefulness of the latter. The fu ll benefits ofIT may indeed involve
cons iderable delays before they are realized. My intent in this chapter, however,
has been to foc us on what the tatistical record allows us to conclude ha actuall y
been achieved, not on what might happen, or what we would like to believe
wi ll happen, in the future. The end-of-century productivity revival needs to be
understood on its own term . We should give the IT revolution its due, but not
more than its due.

Notes
For comments on earlier ve rsions of this wo rk, I am gratefu l to ick Craft , Stanley
Enge m1an , Robert Go rd on, Robert So low, and Gavi n Wright. I al o thank sem inar
and conference parti ci pant at Duke, Virg ini a, Indi ana, Michigan, Yale, UCLA, the All
Ohio Economic History Seminar, the World C liometric confe rence in Venice, and the
Econom ic Hi story Assoc iatio n meetings at San Jo e, Califo rni a.
I . Some scho lars re tri ct the term " De pression" to the years 1929- 1933 . T hi chapter
treat it a ex tend ing over the twelve-year period 1929 to 1941 , during which output
was per i tentl y depres ed below its potenti al. In I 94 1 unempl oyment d ipped into
the single-digit range (9.9 percent) for the fir t ti me in more th an a decade. Even
so, thi s was 6.7 percentage po ints above the 3.2 percent recorded for l 929, and
6. 1 percentage po ints above the 3.8 percent reco rded for 1948 , o 1929- 194 1 does
not make for an ideal peacetime peak-to-peak compari on. T he data in tab le 5. 1
are reported without a cyclical adjustment for 194 1. A recent paper (Fie ld, 2005 )
include one, based on a reg ression of the change in MFP on the change in the
unemployment rate in percentage points between 1929 and 194 1. Thi s regress ion
is then used to pred ict MFP had unemployment in 194 1 been at the I 948 leve l.
Becau e of the trong procyclicality of producti vity durin g the Depre ion years,
the adj ustment ra i e MFP growth fo r the 1929- 194 1 period to 2.78 percent per
year, and lower it for the 194 1- 1948 period to 0.49 percent. Thi adj u tment serves
to accentuate furth er the di tinctiveness of the 1929- 194 1 period.
2. For a more extended di scussion of this issue, see Fie ld (2004a).
3. T he Standard lndu tri al Class ification (SIC) codes are being repl aced in po t- 1997
re porting with No rth Ameri can Industrial Cl assifi cation System (NAICS) codes, but
I use the older vocabu lary throughout thi chapter.
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4. The story to ld here is onl y weakly e n 1t1ve to using l 990 rathe r th an l 989 (the
level of MFP in the pri vate non-farm economy was identical, so the annual rate
calculated wo uld ri se lig htly if we meas ured fro m 1990), altho ugh choosi ng 200 I
rathe r th an 2000 redu ces the calc ul ated grow th rate , ince MFP fe ll between 2000
and 2001.
5. "Chain-type qu antity indexes fo r net stock of nonres identia l fixed assets by industry
gro up and lega l fo rm of organizati on," U S Bureau of Eco nomic Ana lys i (2003), or
www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dN/FAweb/Index2002. htm .
6. T he " d ua l" approac h to esti mating M FP growth loo ks at re lative price c hanges across
sectors as an a lte rnate means of infe rrin g its inc ide nce.
7. As e rtions or a s umpti ons of suc h a I in k are numerou s. " Ongoing techno logica l
advances in these (IT-produc ing) indu stri es have been a direct source of improvement in TFP growth , a we ll as an indirect source of more- rapid capita l deepening" (Jorgenso n and Stiroh , 2000, p. J28). "The spread of info rm ati on tec hn ology
th ro ughout the economy has been a major fac to r in the acceleration of product ivity
th rough capita l deepening" (US Co unc il of Economi c Adv isors, 200 l , p. 33).
8. A ll the subsequ ent d i c u sion of the fi nanc ing of the 1995-2000 inves tment boom
u es nomina l data, whi ch ens ures th at the av ing-inve tme nt identities ho ld for each
year. Infl ation wa re lati vely modest over thi s pe ri od.
9. In thi s res pect a we ll the ra ilroad/ infrastru cture inve tme nt boom of the late nineteenth century was ana logo us to the IT boo m of the late twentieth ce ntury: both
tr iggered, and were as ociated w ith , inflows of ca pi ta l fro m o utside the country.
I 0. Esti mates of the amo un t of the s urge in phys ical capital fo rm ati on have been augme nted by the BLS' 1999 reclassificati on of busine s softwa re acq ui si ti on as capita l
fo rmation (a op po ed to its previo us treatme nt as an inte rmed iate good).
l l. T he BLS capita l share fo r 1995 is 0.3268; fo r 2000, 0 .3 109.
12. A ltern atively, co nverting everythin g to an adj u ted-ho ur bas i , we can calculate a
L.06 percentage po in t increase in the rate of capita l deepe ning (capita l growth less
adjusted-ho ur growth ), impl y ing th at the increase in the rate of cap ital deepening
sho uld have been re ponsible for a 0. 36 pe rce ntage po int inc rease in the g rowth in
o utpu t per adj usted ho ur (0.34 x 1.06). Adding in the inc rease in M FP growt h (0.76
pe rcentage po ints), one conc ludes that outp ut per adj usted labor ho ur ho ul d have
increased a tota l of 1.10 percentage po ints (0.36 + 0.76).
13. T he so urce is th e Burea u of Labor Stati tic : fo r ca pital, "Capita l and re lated measures from the two-d ig it database, J948-200 I "; fo r ho urs, " Industry productivity
indexes and value tabl e," 5 November 2003.
14 . O ve re tim ating the real fl ow of IT goods increases the estim ated growt h of rea l
o utput and of real o utput per ho ur, a we ll a the ca pita l stoc k and thu s the rate
of capital deepe ning. IT goods are, however, a muc h larger fracti on of investment
than they are of o utput; the effect on e ti m ated MFP growth is the refore amb iguo us,
a ltho ugh it i li ke ly to reduce it.
15. I am grateful to Larry Ro e nblum of th e BLS for mak ing these data avai lable to me.
16. In a pa pe r broadl y co n i tent w ith thi view, Fo te r, Ha ltiwa nger, and Krizan (2002)
have arg ued th at mo t of the produ cti v ity adva nce in retai l trade has been the result of
"more produ ct ive e nte rin g e tabli shm ent di sp lac ing m uc h less productive exiting
establi shm en ts."
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17 . For di scuss io n of an earli er revo luti on assoc iated w ith the simultaneo u depl oyment
of the teleg raph and the railroad, see Fie ld ( l 987, 1992 , 1996) and Chandl e r ( 1977) .
18. The M cKin sey stud y pl aces a g reat deal of emph as is on th e Wa l-Mart effect, both in
te rms of its grow ing share of retai I trade and throu gh its rol e as an o bject of imi tation
by such fi rm as Target. But, a lthough th e re port grants th at much of the company 's
s ucces is ba ed on advanced inventory co ntro l methods o bvio usly e nabled by [T
inves tm ent, it a lso stresse th at much i ba ed on management innovati ons such
as worker c ro -training. The implication is that, a lthough it is defensible w ithin
man ufacturin g to c redit virtuall y all the MFP growth to IT, o utside manu fac turing
thi s i not so. Ma ny of th e productiv ity-enh anc ing management imp rovements co uld
and probabl y wo uld have been implemented in the ab ence of new [T tec hno logy.
19 . The ir o utput meas ure also includes an es tim ate of th e imputed service fl ow from
co n umer du ra bl es.
20 . According to Dav id , the nineteenth-century traverse was "set in motion by Thrift,
th at i , by a pronounced ri e in th e proporti on of output saved ." In some passages
he appears to treat it as exogenous, in othe rs as a res ponse to an upward movement
in th e rea l interest rate. In Abramov itz and D avid ( 1973), th e authors speak of
" tec hn ologicall y induced traver es ." The implied arg ume nt eem to be th at new
blueprints lead to an increase in real returns to investm ent, which induces an upsurge
in th e saving rate, propelling one to a differe nt steady tate invol ving hi gher output
pe r ho ur. In Abramovitz and David (2000), the authors suggest that the bi as in
tec hni cal change led to an increa e in capita l' hare, which redi tributed inco me to
ho useho lds w ith hi gher propen ities to save, and thi i the mechani m th at led to
th e upsurge in th e saving rate. William son' 1973 pape r i mo re con si te ntl y based
on an analys i of th e con sequ ences of an upward shift in saving propensities: " For
still unkn own reasons the saving rate rose markedly durin g the Ci vil War decade"
(p. 593).
2 1. Some of thi s surge was drive n by "Y 2K " concerns, pre um abl y a one-time event.
Some of it wa wasted , or, as in the case of fiber optic cabl e in th e te lecom sector,
ove rbuilt.

